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Tradable permits have already been applied in many areas of environmental 
policy and may be a possible response to increasing calls for flexible 
conservation instruments which are able to successfully conserve 
biodiversity while allowing for economic development. The idea behind 
applying tradable permits to conservation is that developers wishing to turn 
land to economic purposes, thereby destroying valuable habitat, may only 
do so if they submit a permit to the conservation agency showing that 
habitat of at least the equivalent ecological value is restored elsewhere. The 
developer himself does not need to carry out the restoration, but may buy a 
permit from a third party thus allowing a market to emerge. However, 
applying tradable permits to biodiversity conservation is a complex issue, 
because destroyed and restored habitats are likely to differ. The purpose of 
this essay is to discuss on a conceptual level the consequences of these 
differences along the dimensions of type, space and time for the design of 
trading rules. We consider the resulting effects on trading activity in the 
permit market and the cost-effectiveness as well as the ecological 
effectiveness of the scheme. We find various trade-offs with regard to 
market activity, cost-effectiveness, ecological effectiveness and transaction 
costs.  
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  1 1. Introduction  
Over the past number of decades the continuous destruction of habitats 
through land use changes caused by economic development has been one of 
the main reasons for loss of biodiversity (Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment 2005). Conservation policies have responded to this threat by 
permanently designating certain areas for conservation and leaving other 
areas for economic development. This policy has in many cases helped to 
conserve biodiversity. However, it has also become obvious that such a 
static approach has its limits.  
 Conservation agencies may not have allocated areas cost-effectively (e.g. 
Ando et al. 1998; Polasky et al. 2008), i.e. designated those areas as habitats 
for endangered species where conservation aims can be achieved at least 
costs (costs are understood here as opportunity costs of foregone economic 
development) (Naidoo et al. 2006). Neglecting the criterion of cost-
effectiveness means that scarce financial resources are being wasted that 
could be used by society for other purposes – including more conservation 
(Shogren et al. 1999). Conservation policies also risk losing public support 
if they are considered wasteful (Wätzold & Schwerdtner 2005).  
But even if the allocation of land for purposes of conservation and economic 
development was once cost-effective, the costs of using land for 
conservation may have changed in a spatially heterogeneous manner over 
time (Armsworth et al. 2006). As a consequence a previously cost-effective 
allocation of land may not be cost-effective anymore (Hartig & Drechsler 
2008).  
A static approach is unable to remedy such violations of the criterion of 
cost-effectiveness which would require a reallocation of land in the sense 
that some conservation area is turned back into land for economic 
development and some part of developed land is again used for 
conservation. Ecological research indicates that a reallocation of land is 
feasible under certain conditions as some species are resilient to land use 
changes and can adapt to small scale disturbances (e.g. Opdam et al. 2006).   
However, implementing reallocation of land on the basis of a top-down 
approach would require an agency to have a high level of information about 
conservation costs and their changes over time. Furthermore, the agency 
needs to be in a strong political position. Changing restrictions on the 
economic development of land implies changes in land prices and is 
therefore prone to lobbying by interest groups (Drechsler & Wätzold 2009).  
Tradable permits, which have been applied in many other areas of 
environmental policy (OECD 1999; Hansjürgens et al. 2005; Tietenberg 
2006), may be a flexible alternative to a top-down approach of changing 
development restrictions by the conservation agency. The idea of applying 
tradable permits to conservation is that a developer who wishes to turn land 
to economic purposes, thereby destroying valuable habitat, may only do so 
after submitting a permit to the conservation agency. A permit can be gained 
by restoring habitat of at least the equivalent ecological value elsewhere, but 
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in this area remains the same, i.e. the ecological effectiveness of the 
instrument is ensured. The developer is not required to carry out the 
restoration, but can buy a permit from a third party. This regulation allows a 
new market to emerge. 
Owners of land on which the costs of conservation are low have an incentive 
to restore valuable habitats, since they can sell the resulting permits on the 
market. Owners of land on which conservation is expensive because of 
foregone benefits of economically developing the land have an incentive to 
realize these benefits and buy the permits. Hence, in principle, permit 
markets provide an incentive for landowners to designate their land in such 
a way that a cost-effective allocation of land use types emerges.  
These general reflections on the cost-effectiveness and ecological 
effectiveness of tradable permits, however, only hold in the unlikely case 
that the destroyed and restored habitat is identical. Following Salzman and 
Ruhl (2000) differences in destroyed and restored habitats may arise along 
the dimensions of type (restored and destroyed habitat provide functional 
values to different species), space (configuration and connectivity of sites 
matters) and time (restoration of habitat requires time leading to increased 
vulnerability).  
The purpose of this essay is to discuss on a conceptual level the 
consequences of differences between destroyed and restored habitats in 
terms of type, space and time for the design of trading rules. We consider 
resulting effects on the trading activity and the cost-effectiveness as well as 
the ecological effectiveness of the scheme and find various trade-offs 
concerning market activity, cost-effectiveness, ecological effectiveness and 
transaction costs.  
Such conceptual reflections may contribute to a better assessment of 
existing conservation policies which exhibit some similarities with tradable 
permit systems (see for Conservation Banking in the USA: Fox & Nino-
Murcia 2005; for Eco-accounts in context of the Impact Mitigation Principle 
in Germany: Köck et al. 2005; and for the Brazil Forest Trade: Chomitz 
2004). As there is an increasing trend towards implementing permit schemes 
for biodiversity conservation (see e.g. the recently implemented Australian 
BioBanking Scheme (Department of Environment and Climate Change 
2008), Biobanking in Malaysia (Malua BioBank 2008), and the EU Green 
Paper on Market Based Instruments (Commission of the European 
Communities 2007)) conceptual reflections may also be helpful for the 
design of new policies.  
Without considering any specific existing policy we start by explaining the 
basic idea of applying tradable permits to biodiversity conservation. It is 
pointed out that a certain trading activity is required for functioning permit 
markets, and the factors that impact on trading activity are identified. There 
follows a discussion of the consequences of differences between destroyed 
and restored habitats along the dimensions of type, space and time for the 
design of trading rules. We conclude that trade-offs with regard to market 
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exist and outline requirements for further research. 
 
2. Functioning of a permit scheme  
The basic idea of applying tradable permits to biodiversity conservation is 
that particular sites may be destroyed and used for economic development as 
long as developers can submit a “permit” to a regulatory authority. 
Landowners can generate permits by restoring habitats within the region. 
Permits are tradable on the market and trading rules should ensure that the 
conservation value of the destroyed site and the conservation value of the 
restored site are equivalent, so that the overall conservation value of the 
region cannot decline.  
To be able to compare the ecological value of a destroyed and restored site 
an exchange unit is required which measures the ecological value of a site 
and its contribution to the overall ecological value in the region. For this 
purpose, the conservation objective needs to be specified: e.g. minimizing 
extinction risks of selected species or maximizing coverage of species. 
Depending on how these objectives are chosen, the contribution of 
individual sites to maintaining the overall ecological value may differ (cf. 
Nicholson & Possingham 2006).  
Depending on the exchange unit used to determine the value of a site, 
different degrees of complexity are exhibited. A rather simple exchange unit 
is area. This is easy to measure, but has the disadvantage of being only a 
rough measure of conservation value because it neglects factors such as 
connectivity with other sites, which influences the suitability of a habitat for 
species (cf. Briers 2002). An example of a more accurate exchange unit, but 
one that is also more difficult to measure, is the contribution of a site to a 
change in the extinction risk of a species (see also the discussion on 
surrogates in e.g. Rodrigues & Brooks 2007; Cabeza et al. 2008). 
Demand for permits may arise from private firms, e.g. for developing 
industrial parks and from government agencies, e.g. for infrastructure 
projects such as new roads. Another source of demand may be private 
individuals or conservation groups who do not use their permits for 
development purposes but keep them, thereby enhancing the ecological 
value in a region.  
Supply of permits may come from private landowners such as farmers and 
forest owners, but also from state authorities and conservation groups in 
possession of land. If suppliers specialize in the creation of ecological value, 
cost savings and quality improvements through learning effects and 
economies of scale are likely.  
Permit markets can be designed in such a way that the conservation value of 
a region is enhanced. Next to the possibility that conservation groups buy 
permits and do not use them for economic development, trading rules can 
induce such an effect by requiring that the destruction of habitat of a certain 
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larger value.  
Tradable permit markets are artificially created through the establishment of 
rights and permits (Montgomery 1972). There are several possibilities for 
the initial allocation of rights and permits. Similar to the grandfathering 
approach in emissions trading, one possible initial allocation is based on the 
existing allocation of land for economic development. The owners are given 
the right to continue with the existing land use and no permits are needed for 
the land already used for economic purposes.  
In contrast, no landowner is granted the right to use his land for economic 
development without acquiring a permit. Initially, permits may be allocated 
through auctions. A landowner who does not obtain a permit is required to 
stop economic development on his land and use the land for conservation. 
An auction might only take place during the first round, the subsequent 
allocations are organized via trading of permits.  
A third alternative is to require each landowner to maintain a certain 
percentage of his land for conservation while allocating him the right to 
develop the rest of the land. Each unit of land entitles to a certain amount of 
permits for economic development, but also implies the obligation to submit 
a certain amount of permits. Depending on the share of the land between 
conservation and economic development, landowners have either a permit 
deficit – implying that they have to buy permits or restore habitat – or a 
permit surplus – implying that they can economically develop parts of their 
land or sell these permits on the market.  
These initial allocations have different distributional consequences. In the 
case of  grandfathering, owners of land used for economic development do 
not have to pay for permits, whereas auctioning requires payments for past 
development and consequently generates additional revenue for the 
government. Obligations according to a certain percentage requirement 
imply a form of redistribution from owners who have previously caused 
negative ecological impacts by developing their land, to those who kept 
their land in a way valuable for conservation.  
In the introductory phase of the scheme, auctioning and initial allocations 
based on the size of land might lead to higher transaction costs than 
grandfathering, since each landowner has to have sufficient permits for his 
land. However, these obligations automatically initiate a certain market 
activity. If preexisting tax distortions are taken into account, auctioning has 
the advantage that revenues generated from auctioning can be used to reduce 
distorting taxes in factor markets and, hence, can increase the efficiency of 
the tax system (Goulder et al. 1997). This is similar to the idea of “double 
dividends” from environmental taxes where tax revenues are employed to 
reduce distortionary taxes (Parry et al. 1999).  
A regulatory authority is necessary for a functioning permit scheme. One 
important task of such an authority is to design the rules that determine 
which habitats are exchangeable and to assess the value of destroyed and 
created habitats according to these rules. Furthermore, the authority would 
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for a functioning market and to ensure that the conservation target is met.  
 
3. Challenges for applying tradable permits to 
conservation 
Permit markets function best if the environmental impacts of the damaging 
and the compensating activity can be easily quantified and compared. For 
example, the contribution of burning fossil fuels to the greenhouse effect 
can be measured in units of CO2 emissions and the impact of CO2 is 
independent of the location and (within limits) the time of its emission, 
hence comparison is easy. This, however, is different for habitats.  
Salzman and Ruhl (2000) identify three important dimensions in which 
destroyed and created habitat sites may differ: Type (the restored and 
destroyed site may provide functional values to different species and life 
stages); space (the destroyed habitat may have been part of a contiguous 
habitat system for species, whereas the restored habitat may be isolated and 
thus of less value); and time (species need time to colonize, time lags 
between destruction and recreation increase vulnerability). Habitats also 
perform ecosystem functions to different extents, e.g. as places for human 
recreation and watersheds. However, here we focus on biodiversity 
conservation only. 
Strict requirements in terms of identity of destroyed and restored habitats 
imply fewer opportunities for restoring habitats and, hence, less active 
permit markets. However, functioning markets require a certain trading 
activity. We develop this argument in the next section, and afterwards 
analyze the implications of habitat differences in terms of type, space and 
time.  
 
3.1 Market activity 
A certain level of market activity is essential for a functioning market. Large 
markets with a significant number of participants and high trading activities 
facilitate finding the adequate market partner, implying lower information 
costs for market participants. Markets with low trading activity increase the 
uncertainty of permit price developments. False price signals may be the 
outcome, resulting in wrong decisions about land development (Baron 
1999). In extreme cases an expected lack of demand may deter investors 
who restore habitat from participating in the market, leading to a market 
collapse (e.g. Panayotou 1994).   
Another problem in markets with low trading activity may be market power. 
Market power exists when a firm can exert an influence on the permit price, 
which may arise when it holds a large market share (Hahn 1984). On the 
supply side, market power arises if a firm is able to raise prices above the 
competitive level. This may lead to a welfare loss if the price increase is 
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given a competitive market price for permits. However, prices can only be 
raised up to a certain level, namely, the costs an economic developer would 
incur to restore a habitat on his own (Mead 2008).  
On the demand side a dominant firm, e.g. a large-scale investor for a 
business park being the only developer in a region, might be able to push the 
price for permits below the competitive level by determining the quantity of 
demand. Such a situation is unlikely as long as landowners have alternatives 
for using their land (e.g. for agriculture). 
Market activity depends on several factors. Of the factors mentioned below 
the first two are determined exogenously. Decisions about instrument design 
may have an influence on the remaining factors:  
1.  Economic development: In regions with little economic growth the 
demand for tradable permits will be low, reducing the frequency of 
transactions.  
2.  Differences in opportunity costs: If opportunity costs of conservation are 
equal among sites there is no incentive to trade. The higher the differences, 
the more gains from trading can be realized.  
3.  Combination of tradable permits with regulation: Additional regulation 
may restrict trading opportunities, e.g. regulation may prescribe a minimum 
density of conservation area on each landowner’s site and permits for 
developing land economically can only be used when this density is secured 
(see Staehelin-Witt and Spillmann (1994) for a case where implementing an 
emissions trading scheme on top of regulation failed because the regulation 
was so strict that no trading developed). 
4.  Regional size of the market: A larger regional size is likely to lead to 
higher opportunity-cost differences and, hence, higher trading activities (cf. 
Newell & Stavins 2003; Chomitz 2004).  
5.  Exchange requirements: The more specific the requirements for habitat 
to be exchangeable the less trading activities can be expected.  
6.  Transaction costs of market exchange: High transaction costs may arise 
as a result of complicated and time-consuming administrative procedures. 
Furthermore, if there is no transparency about market prices transactions 
might be accompanied by costly bargaining. High transaction costs may 
reduce market activity.  
In summary, large markets with high trading activity are preferable. 
However, when designing tradable permit schemes other aspects need to be 
considered to which we now turn.  
 
3.2. Type 
Here the “habitat type” of a site refers to its suitability for particular species. 
Habitats are of the same type if they provide the same functional values to a 
group of species at a certain life stage. If the objective is to maintain the 
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same type is unproblematic, but trade between different types of habitats is 
bound to violate this target. However, there are arguments for trade between 
habitat types under certain circumstances. 
Habitat types may differ in terms of scarcity so that some species are more 
endangered than others. If conservation objectives are directed at 
particularly endangered species, the regulator can create incentives to 
restore scarce habitat types by determining adequate trading ratios. If, for 
example, grassland species are more endangered than forest species the 
regulator may prefer to promote the restoration of grasslands rather than 
forests. If the trading ratio between a grassland unit and a forest unit is 
greater than the ratio of costs of restoring a grassland unit and the costs of 
restoring a forest unit, there will be an incentive to create grasslands rather 
than forests.  
There is a certain risk that the trading ratio does not provide the correct 
signals with the implication that the scheme ceases to be ecologically 
effective. For example, the regulator might not be correctly informed of the 
costs of restoring different habitat types and hence might determine a 
“wrong” ratio. Costs may also change over time implying the risk that a 
trading ratio that once provided the correct scarcity signals may not do this 
anymore.  
To avoid the risk that an already scarce habitat becomes even more scarce, 
trade may only be allowed in one direction. Destroying habitat of the less 
scarce type may be compensated by restoring all types of habitat, but 
destroying the scarce habitat type can only be compensated through 
restoring the same habitat type. In the example given above, the destruction 
of forests might be compensated by the restoration of grasslands and forests, 
but the destruction of grassland by the restoration of grassland only.  
To ensure that such trading does not lead to a critical loss of habitat for 
species not currently endangered, a minimum amount of each habitat type 
might be determined. If this level is reached, trading between habitats would 
not be allowed or would only be allowed in one direction to secure that the 
amount of habitat does not go below the critical level.  
A more complex way of taking into account the changing levels of scarcity 
of habitat types is to constantly adjust trading ratios to scarcities. A 
disadvantage of such a flexible adjustment is the uncertainty for market 
participants about future values of their land in terms of developing it for 
conservation. Such a complex regulation also increases transaction costs, 
here in particular the information a regulator has to acquire about changes in 
the scarcity of habitat types and the effects of trading ratios on landowners’ 
behaviour. 
An advantage of allowing trade between different habitat types is that it 
leads to larger markets which may generate a higher level of cost-
effectiveness and all the positive aspects that arise from increased market 
activity.   
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The survival probability of a species depends not only on the overall habitat 
size, but also on the configuration of sites, as well as the distance and 
connectivity between them (Fahrig 2003). Ecological theory shows that for 
many species connected habitat sites are more valuable than isolated ones, 
because species can migrate between sites, facilitating recolonization of 
sites in which a population has become extinct (Hanski 1998). This means 
that the ecological value of sites is space dependent, i.e. it depends on the 
location of other habitats. When the spatial dimension is neglected in the 
design of trading rules, resulting configurations are likely to be less cost-
effective than with rules that take into account the spatial dimension (Hartig 
& Drechsler 2008). 
Given that – everything else being equal – neighboring sites tend to have a 
higher ecological value than isolated ones, there is a straightforward 
possibility to include spatial interdependencies in trading rules: The 
restoration of a habitat site in the neighborhood of other habitats leads to a 
higher valued permit than the restoration of an isolated one, and – 
analogously – the destruction of a habitat site in the neighborhood of other 
habitat requires a higher valued permit than the destruction of an isolated 
site (Drechsler & Wätzold 2009).  
This idea is similar to the agglomeration bonus which has been suggested to 
provide incentives for generating ecologically valuable spatial 
configurations in the context of conservation payments (Parkhurst et al. 
2002; Drechsler et al. 2007). To avoid confusion with the agglomeration 
bonus idea we call the additional value that is generated through 
neighboring sites in the context of tradable permits “neighborhood bonus”.  
The implementation of the neighborhood bonus idea leads to some 
difficulties. The main reason is that it requires re-evaluation once the land 
use of neighboring sites changes and decisions have to be made on who 
receives the created additional permit value and who bears the costs of the 
destroyed permit value. The problem here is that the re-evaluations may not 
be a result of the actions of the landowners themselves, but of their 
neighbors. 
The allocation of costs and benefits from land use changes depends on the 
allocation of property rights (cf. Coase 1960). We can distinguish between 
two main options: The first option is that landowners have the right to 
modify land use on their own land, regardless of their neighbors’ 
preferences. The second option is that landowners do not have the right to 
change their land use without their neighbors’ prior agreement. Leaving 
aside the possibility of negotiations and side payments between landowners, 
it can be concluded for both options that individual decisions do not take 
into account the (positive or negative) impact on the ecological value of 
their neighbors’ sites, suggesting that this does not lead to a cost-effective 
solution. 
Assuming profit-maximizing and perfectly informed landowners and taking 
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expect a neighborhood to find a regionally cost-effective solution, because 
neighborhood effects are incorporated into the decision (cf. Coase 1960). In 
the case of the second option, the neighbors will only agree if the intended 
land use change is beneficial to them, or, if they receive side payments 
which at least cover their (expected) costs. Expected costs arise if neighbors 
plan to change their land use in the future and expect higher costs for permit 
acquisition required for economic development or lower benefits from 
selling permits generated from habitat restoration. Similarly for the first 
option voluntary side payments – from the neighbors to the landowner who 
aims to change his land use – should achieve the same solution. To what 
extent side payments are likely to happen depends on the related transaction 
costs.   
Which option a society chooses depends strongly on the prevalent 
perception of the adequate allocation of property rights. Evaluating the 
neighbourhood bonus one has to consider that trading rules that include a 
bonus are likely to lead to additional transaction costs. The rule itself might 
be more complex and hence difficult to understand than exchange rules that 
are based on a simple unit such as patch size. Moreover, communication and 
negotiation between landowners increase transaction costs.  
Zoning is an alternative to the neighborhood bonus for considering spatial 
interdependencies of habitat sites on a regional level. Similar to the area of 
transferable development rights (Thorsnes & Simons 1999) zoning could be 
applied to conservation in a way that in areas with many isolated habitat 
sites destruction is allowed whereas in areas with a high habitat density this 
is not the case (cf. Mills 1980). An alternative rule would be that in areas 
with a high habitat density destruction is allowed until a certain critical 
minimum density is reached. Then the destruction of sites is only allowed in 
other areas.   
One disadvantage of zoning is that it puts restrictions on trade which may 
lead to less market activity and negatively impacts cost-effectiveness by 
preventing the use of economically valuable areas for economic 
development. Furthermore, with zoning the connectivity of a site with other 
sites in the region is only indirectly considered. The likelihood that a site is 
connected with other sites can be increased when the assigned zones are 
smaller or the required density is higher. However, this leads to less market 
activity.  
Given that neither zoning nor the neighborhood bonus are perfect solutions, 
one may also follow Tietenberg’s (1995, p.98) proposition that “one way of 
dealing with the spatial complexity […] is to ignore it”. Which of the three 
options is the best way to deal with spatial interdependencies is an empirical 
issue. It depends on how important habitat connectivity is for the species to 
be protected, the size of transaction costs arising from zoning and the 
neighborhood bonus and the extent trading restrictions influence market 
activity and cost-effectiveness.  
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For species persistence, the continuous existence of habitat is relevant. 
Frequent change in land use and long time lags between habitat destruction 
and restoration may negatively impact species survival. Habitats can take a 
long time to regenerate, e.g. forests require decades of growth before 
providing adequate habitats for certain species. Also, species need time to 
recolonize their new habitats (Keymer et al. 2000).  
To ensure that an exchange fully compensates an impact, trade should only 
be allowed after restoration has been successful and the land has been 
recolonized by species. However, this can lead to difficulties for market 
participants in finding trading partners which can limit market activity and 
reduce cost saving potentials. Significant costs may also arise through 
delayed development (e.g. Eppink & Wätzold 2009) if an economic 
developer does not find an exchangeable permit at the time he requires it. 
On the supply side uncertainty about the future permit price exists for 
landowners when restoring habitat as they will only be able to sell the 
resulting permit in the somewhat distant future.  
One option for facilitating trade when there are temporal discontinuities is 
banking: After a habitat is restored, permits need not be sold immediately. 
As a reward for the temporal conservation gain that arises from the 
temporary provision of additional ecological value, additional permits could 
be allocated to the land owner similar to interest payments.  
If a species is not critically endangered borrowing could be allowed. 
Development projects would be endorsed without the submission of a 
permit at the time of destruction, but requiring later submission and 
additional permits for the time lag again similar to interest payments. 
Factors that should be reflected in the size of the “interest rate” are the 
temporal losses in ecological services when the habitat is not provided, and 
the increase in the risk for species survival as a result of borrowing (for 
evaluating interim losses of habitat compare Dunford et al. (2004)). Since 
this risk is species specific interest rates may differ among habitat types. An 
analysis of banking in emissions trading shows that the trading rules also 
need to counteract discounting of firms, which results in firms taking 
environmental action as late as possible (Kling & Rubin 1997).   
A knock-on effect of earning interest on the early provision of habitat is that 
the criterion of ecological effectiveness might be violated as the ecological 
value of a region might deviate from the targeted conservation level. 
Suppose a supplier restores habitat and does not sell the permit immediately. 
Through interest the permit accumulates additional value and can be used to 
compensate for a destroyed site with a higher ecological value than the 
previously restored site. Such an exchange results in an reduced overall 
ecological value. Thus, allowing for banking implies fluctuating ecological 
values of a region over time. As a consequence, there is a risk that the 
overall ecological value is reduced to a level which might be considered 
critical. To avoid that risk a lower limit for the ecological value might be 
introduced beyond which banking with interest payments and borrowing are 
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One important aspect that needs to be considered if time lags between 
destruction and restoration are allowed is to ensure that restoration actually 
takes place. If a permit is given to an individual or an organization based on 
the promise that the creation of a habitat is being completed at a certain date 
in the future there is a risk that the individual or organization becomes 
bankrupt before the habitat is completed. One way of ensuring that the 
restoration of the habitat is completed in such a case is to keep the payment 
for the permit or part of it with a trustee until the new habitat is completely 
restored.  
Similarly, appointing a trustee is one option to ensure the availability of 
financing for habitats that require continuous management. An example of 
such a habitat type is open grassland which requires management to avoid 
succession. The regulator could then only issue a permit if the organisation 
aiming to sell the permit commits itself to managing the habitat over a 
certain period and offers secured financing. A certain amount of the revenue 
generated from selling the permit could be given to a trust fund which 
releases this money (including interest rates generated from it) in 
installments over the period for which the organisation commits itself to 
management.  
When conservation costs frequently change in a spatially heterogeneous 
manner, landowners might want to change their land use accordingly. 
Species, however, might not easily adapt to frequent land use changes. This 
problem may be addressed by imposing minimum durations on how long a 
site must be maintained for conservation once it has been restored. This 
decision again involves a trade-off: While frequent changes in habitat 
structure endanger the ability of species to adapt, more permanent spatial 
habitat structures leave less room for trading and hence have a negative 
impact on cost-effectiveness and market activity.   
 
4. Conclusion and future research 
Tradable permits are a promising instrument for biodiversity conservation, 
since they open up opportunities for cost-effective and ecologically effective 
dynamic adaptation to spatially heterogeneous economic development. 
Challenges for applying tradable permits to conservation arise because the 
destroyed and the restored habitat may differ along the dimensions of type, 
space and time. We discussed the consequences of these differences as well 
as the requirement of a certain market activity for the design of trading rules 
and identified various trade-offs.  
Allowing trade between different types of habitats has a positive effect on 
market activity, but may violate the ecological effectiveness of the scheme. 
It may still be advantageous from an ecological point of view if trading rules 
are designed in such a way that they provide incentives for restoring habitat 
for highly endangered species. As the survival probability of species 
depends on the connectivity and distance of habitat sites, the criterion of 
  12 cost-effectiveness calls for the consideration of spatial aspects in the design 
of trading rules. Two possible options are a neighborhood bonus and zoning, 
but both options lead to additional transaction costs and may negatively 
influence market activity. With regard to the temporal dimension, banking 
and borrowing have a positive effect on trading but may endanger the 
ecological effectiveness of the scheme. Similarly, allowing frequent changes 
in land use may endanger the ability of species to adapt. Requiring more 
permanent spatial habitat structures, on the other hand, leaves less room for 
trading. 
Further research is required to better understand and perhaps quantify the 
identified trade-offs for specific conservation objectives, so that existing 
permit schemes can be improved and new schemes can be better designed. 
Moreover, research is needed to develop innovative trading rules that are 
able to mitigate the trade-offs. Such research has to take into account both 
ecological and economic knowledge, thus making close co-operation 
between ecologists and economists essential (cf. Wätzold et al. 2006; 
Baumgärtner et al. 2009).  
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